When Delay Becomes Liability: understanding “administrative inertia”
The failure of a public authority to act within the required timeframe constitutes a breach of its duty to decide, commonly referred to as administrative inertia.
This form of inaction amounts to a failure to exercise administrative power and represents conduct that undermines both the public interest—by preventing the timely pursuit of administrative aims—and the private interest of the individual, who is denied the right to obtain a decision within the time limit laid down by law.Over time, various legislative mechanisms have been introduced to address this issue. Among them is Article 2-bis of Law No. 241/1990, which provides a right to compensation where an authority fails to conclude a procedure within the prescribed period.However, the mere fact of delay does not automatically give rise to a compensable loss. Article 2-bis requires proof that the administration’s inertia was culpable, and the burden of establishing this element rests entirely on the claimant.Accordingly, where an authority delays the adoption of a favourable administrative measure, the claimant must demonstrate every constituent element of the compensation claim. The court must assess both the objective requirements (the unlawfulness of the failure to act, the existence of unjust damage deserving of redress, and the causal link between the omission and the harm) and the subjective element (intent or negligence on the part of the administration).In a recent decision—TAR Lazio, judgment No. 16757/2025—the court rejected a claim for damages arising from the failure to decide on a request to extend a concession. The court held that, under Article 2-bis, compensation for delay requires proof of culpable inertia; the mere breach of the statutory time limit for concluding the procedure is not enough. For further reference:TAR Lazio, Judgment No. 16757/2025; Article 2-bis, Law 241/1990.
